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A quantum cryptography scheme based on entanglement between a single particle state
and a vacuum state is proposed. The scheme utilizes linear optics devices to detect the
superposition of the vacuum and single particle states. Existence of an eavesdropper can be
detected by using a variant of Bell’s inequality.
Entanglement could be exploited in many interesting
applications, including quantum teleportation [1, 2] and
quantum cryptography [3]. Discussion on the nonlocal
nature (entanglement) of quantum systems was initiated
by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (EPR) [4] and later ex-
tended by Bell [5–7]. Since then many authors have stud-
ied the physical meaning of the nonlocality of a single par-
ticle [8–15]. Generally, quantum cryptography schemes
based on entanglement (EPR-based schemes) use two or
more spatially separated particles possessing correlated
properties as the source of entanglement. However, re-
cent developments in experimental techniques [16–18] for
generating and manipulating single photons have made
quantum information processing utilizing single particle
entanglement feasible. Here, single particle entanglement
refers to entanglement of a single particle state and the
vacuum state [19].
In the present study, we developed a quantum cryptog-
raphy scheme based on single particle entanglement. The
propopsed scheme utilizes linear optics to detect a super-
position of the vacuum state and a single photon state.
A variant of Bell’s inequality suggested by Peres [20] is
used for the detection of eavesdropping. In fact, the idea
of quantum cryptography using single particle entangle-
ment is not new. Examples of other approaches that can
be considered as quantum cryptography schemes using
single particle entanglement are the phase coding scheme
of Bennett [21] and Ardehali’s scheme based on the de-
layed choice experiment [22], which uses interferometers.
In these double-rail schemes, detection of a particle state
is performed by a single observer at a given site. A char-
acteristic feature of our single rail scheme is that both of
two space-like separated parties, whom we call Alice and
Bob, detect either a single particle or no particle at their
respective sites. This characteristic makes our scheme
more compatible with the original meaning of quantum
nonlocality.
We begin with a description of our scheme, which is
depicted in Fig. 1. The setup consists of a single pho-
ton source (S) and a lossless 50/50 beam splitter (BS0),
which generate the single particle entanglement state,
and two identical non-deterministic projective measure-
ment devices belonging to Alice and Bob, respectively.
Each projective measurement device shown in detail in
Fig. 2 itself consists of a lossless 50/50 beam splitter
(BSA or BSB) with a probe state γ|0〉 + δ|1〉 and two
photon detectors (DAa, DAb or DBa, DBb). We assume
that every beam splitter induces a sign change in a trans-
mitted beam incident on the black side (Eq. (2)).
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FIG. 1. Schematic of the experimental setup for quantum
cryptography based on single particle entanglement. See text
for a detailed explanation.
The output state emerging from the beam splitter BS0
is given by (see Eq. (4))
|φ〉 = 1√
2
(|1〉A|0〉B − |0〉A|1〉B) , (1)
where subscripts A and B refer to the modes of the pho-
1
tons exiting the beam splitter through the output ports
A (towards Alice) and B (towards Bob), respectively, and
|1〉 and |0〉 are the single photon state and the vacuum
state, respectively.
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FIG. 2. Schematic of a device for performing a nondeter-
ministic projective measurement of the superposition state of
the vacuum and a single photon α|0〉 + β|1〉. γ|0〉 + δ|1〉 is a
known probe state.
The state given in Eq. (1) represents a single-photon
entangled state. Following the argument of Peres [20] ,
Alice and Bob, who test a violation of the Bell’s inequal-
ity, measure the projection on the superposed state of
a single particle and the vacuum α|0〉 + β|1〉. However,
detection of the superposition of a particle state and the
vacuum state is made difficult by the fact that the su-
perposed state is not a particle number eigenstate. The
experimental setup shown in Fig. 2, which is a general-
ization of the setup considered in Ref. 24, can be used
to detect the superposed state. The beam splitter BS
(corresponding to the beam splitter BSA or BSB in Fig.
1) performs the mode transformation(
a′
b′
)
=
( √
R
√
1−R
−√1−R √R
)(
a
b
)
, (2)
where R is the reflectivity of the beam splitter. Using
second quantized notation, the general form of the input
state shown in Fig. 2 can be written as
ψ = (γ + δa†)(α+ βb†)|0〉 (3)
with normalization requirements γ2 + δ2 = 1 and α2 +
β2 = 1. Here, γ|0〉 + δ|1〉 is a known probe state with
fixed γ and δ, while α|0〉 + β|1〉 is an unknown state to
be measured. The probe state can be prepared by linear
optics with coherent light and a single photon state [24]
or by parametric down conversions [10]. By replacing
a and b in Eq. (3) with a′ and b′ obtained from the
transformation Eq. (2), we obtain the following output
state
ψ = [αγ +
√
R(1−R)βδ(a′†2 − b′†2)− βδ(1 − 2R)a′†b′† (4)
+ (
√
1−Rβγ +
√
Rαδ)a′†
+ (
√
Rβ γ −√1−Rα δ)b′†]|0〉
Hence, by setting R = 1/2 and choosing γ and δ which
satisfy
αδ = βγ, (5)
one finds that the coefficient of the b′† term vanishes while
that of the a′† term does not. In other words, there is
a possibility that detector Da detects a single photon,
while Db detects none. By noting this event, one can
perform a nondeterministic projection on the superpo-
sition state α|0〉 + β|1〉. Using the parameters chosen
above, the output state can be written as
ψ = αγ|00〉+
√
2βγ|10〉+ βδ√
2
(|20〉 − |02〉), (6)
where |ij〉 denotes the state with i particles in mode a′
and j particles in mode b′. Thus, the probability of mea-
suring |10〉 is 2|βγ|2 ≤ 1/2, because |γ| = |α| from Eq.
(5). Similarly, if the input state is α|0〉 − β|1〉, the roles
of the a′† and b′† terms are interchanged and we obtain
the |01〉 term instead of the |10〉 term. In this way, the
observers are able to measure a projection on a super-
posed state α|0〉 ± β|1〉 (P ′A and P ′B in Eq. (7)) of a
single photon and the vacuum. We now discuss how to
detect the presence of an eavesdropper using the projec-
tive measurement devices described above in conjunction
with Bell’s inequality. Choosing four projection opera-
tors
PA ≡ |1〉A〈1|A, PB ≡ |1〉B〈1|B, (7)
P ′A ≡ (α|0〉A + β|1〉A)(α∗〈0|A + β∗〈1|A),
P ′B ≡ (α|0〉B − β|1〉B)(α∗〈0|B − β∗〈1|B),
one can obtain expectation values of the operators
〈φ|P ′A|φ〉 = 〈φ|P ′B |φ〉 =
1
2
, (8)
〈φ|P ′APB|φ〉 = 〈φ|PAP ′B|φ〉 =
|β|2
2
,
〈φ|PAPB|φ〉 = 0, 〈φ|P ′AP ′B|φ〉 = 2|αβ|2.
From these expectation values one can define a quantity
S ≡ 〈φ|P ′A + P ′B − P ′AP ′B − P ′APB − PAP ′B + PAPB|φ〉 (9)
= |α|2(1− 2|β|2),
which violates the following version of Bell’s inequality,
formulated by Peres
0 ≤ S ≤ 1 (10)
when |β| > 1/√2 and α 6= 0. This inequality is obtained
when we assume a local hidden variable. As usual, pos-
sible interception, detection and substitution of the pho-
tons by an eavesdropper is equivalent to introducing a
2
local hidden variable into the system. In this case, Alice
and Bob obtain not S but
SE =
∫
ρ(EA, EB)dEAdEB [pA(EA, A
′) + pB(EB, B
′) (11)
− pA(EA, A′)pB(EB , B′)− pA(EA, A′)pB(EB , B)
− pA(EA, A)pB(EB, B′) + pA(EA, A)pB(EB , B)],
where ρ(EA, EB) is the probability that Eve measures the
projection on a state |EA〉 at photon A (P|EA〉) and |EB〉
at photon B (P|EB〉). This represents the strategy of the
eavesdropper. pA(EA, A
′) denotes the probability of a
count from Alice’s detector when she tests the projection
operator P ′A after Eve has tested the projection operator
P|EA〉 on the photon A. It is expressed by the quantum
calculation
pA(EA, A
′) = 〈φ|P ′AP|EA〉|φ〉. (12)
For example, setting α = 1/2 and β =
√
3/2 and consid-
ering the special case in which the eavesdropper measures
only photon A, we obtain from Eqs. (7) and (12)
SE =
∫
ρ(EA, EB)dEAdEB [1− pA(EA, A′)] (13)
=
∫
ρ(EA)dEA
[
1− |α′ +
√
3
2
β′|2
]
,
where |EA〉 ≡ α′|0〉A+β′|1〉A. With the triangle inequal-
ity, this implies 1/4 ≤ SE ≤ 1, which contradicts the
quantum prediction of S = −1/8 obtained from Eq. (9)
for the system with no eavesdropper. In this respect one
may say that our scheme represents another experimental
method for examining the single particle nonlocality.
We may now proceed to the discussion of a key distri-
bution scheme going as follows.
(i) The photon source (S) and beam splitters (BS0) pe-
riodically generate the single photon entangled state.
(ii) At a photon arrival time, Alice measures a projection
operator randomly chosen between PA and P
′
A. Similarly,
at the same time, Bob measures PB or P
′
B . This corre-
sponds to the selection of the analyzer axis in ordinary
two particle quantum cryptography schemes.
(iii) After a series of measurements Alice and Bob an-
nounce to each other which projection operator they
chose. If Alice chose PA and Bob chose PB (probability
1/4), one of them will detect a photon and the other will
not. Then they can share a random raw key 1 (say, for a
photon) and 0 (for vacuum). With a probability of 3/4,
either Alice chooses P ′A or Bob chooses P
′
B . Since their
results are not anti-correlated (see Eq. (8)) in these cases,
they cannot extract keys. However, these discarded data
together with the anti-correlated data from the previous
step can be used to detect eavesdroppers, as shown in
the next step.
(iv) Detection of eavesdroppers is possible by publicly
comparing a subset of the results of Alice and Bob using
Eq. (9) and Eq. (10), as described above.
We now briefly discuss another scheme that adopts de-
terministic projective measurement devices using cavity
QED. The setup of this scheme, shown in Fig. 3, is sim-
ilar to that considered by Davidovich et al., Freyberger,
Moussa and Baseia [25–27], except that the single particle
entangled state |φ〉 is generated not by an atom crossing
the two cavities, but by the beam splitter (BS) and the
single photon source (S) as in Fig. 1.
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FIG. 3. Schematic of the apparatus for quantum cryptog-
raphy with deterministic projective measurement using cavity
QED.
Assuming that at time t = 0 two ground state atoms
|g〉A and |g〉B are injected into the cavities CA and CB,
respectively, the total cavities-atom state is then |ψ(0)〉 =
|φ〉|g〉A|g〉B. The interaction between atoms and photons
in the cavity Ck (k = A,B) is described by the Jaynes-
Cummings Hamiltonian
HkI = h¯λ(σ+,kak + σ−,ka
†
k), (14)
where λ is a coupling constant and σ+,k, σ−,k and a
†
k, ak
are the raising and lowering operators for the atom and
photon states, respectively. In the cavities, these atoms
interact with the photons injected into the cavities. In
Refs. 25–27, it was shown that by choosing the interac-
tion time t to be λt = pi/2, one can replicate the infor-
mation of the entanglement of the photon states |φ〉 to
that of the atoms. In other words, the state becomes
|ψ(t)〉 = exp[−i/h¯(ΣkHkI )t]|ψ(0)〉 (15)
=
1√
2
(|e〉A|g〉B − |g〉A|e〉B) |0〉A|0〉B,
The projective measurement on α|0〉 + β|1〉 can be per-
formed as follows. Microwave fields are appropriately
adjusted in the Ramsey zones (Rk) such that a super-
position of the ground state and the excited state of the
atom, α|g〉k+β|e〉k, with |α|2+|β|2 = 1, undergoes a uni-
tary evolution to the excited state |e〉k, which registers a
3
click in the state-selective ionization detectorDk. Except
for the measurement devices, the procedure followed in
this scheme is the same as that with linear optics devices
shown in Fig. 1.
Our scheme has the following merits compared to or-
dinary quantum cryptography schemes. First, compared
to the ordinary two-particle EPR-based scheme, it is eas-
ier for our scheme to generate vacuum and single particle
entanglement using beam splitters. Of course, our model
entails the detection of a superposition of the vacuum
and single photon states, which is rather difficult to im-
plement. However, the difficulty involved in detecting the
superposed state will also be encountered by eavesdrop-
pers. Second, compared to non-EPR based schemes such
as the BB84 scheme, it is easier for EPR-based schemes
to use quantum repeaters [28] based on quantum telepor-
tation [15] to send information to distant observers. One
shortcoming of our scheme is that, due to low detection
efficiency , Bob may sometimes confuse a loss of signal
with the vacuum state. In this case, Alice and Bob need
to distill a secret key from the series of keys using privacy
amplification [29].
In summary, we have proposed a new quantum cryp-
tography technique based on single particle entanglement
using linear optics devices and Bell’s inequality to detect
the presence of eavesdroppers.
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